Taylor's solution: causal and logical necessity

This is how taylor solved the problem about causal and logical necessity:

“Philosophers have long since pointed out that causal connections involve no logical necessity, that the denial of a particular causal connection is never self-contradictory, and this is undoubtedly true. But neither does this assertion or the denial of determinism is any concept of what is and what is not logically necessary. If determinism is true, then anything that happens is, given the conditions under which it occurs, the only thing possible, the thing that is necessitated by those conditions. But it is not the only thing that is logically possible, nor do those conditions logically necessitate it. Similarly, if one denies the thesis of determinism, by asserting, for instance, that each of two bodily notions is possible for him under identical conditions, he is asserting much more than that each is logically possible, for that would be trivial claim.

“This distinction, between logical necessity and the sort of necessity in determinism, can be illustrated with example. If, for instance, a man beheaded, we can surely say that it is impossible for him to go on living, that his being beheaded necessitates his death, and so on; but there are no logical necessities or impossibilities involve here. It is not logically impossible for a man to live without his head. Yet no one will deny that man cannot live under conditions that include his being headless, that such state of affairs is in a perfectly clear sense impossible. Similarly, if my finger is in a tight and fairly strong cast, then it is impossible for me to move it in any way at all, though this not logically impossible. It is logically possible that I should be vastly stronger that I am, and that I should move it and, in doing so, break the cast, though this would ordinarily not be possible in the sense that concerns us. Again, it is not logically possible that I should bend my finger backward, or into a know, though it is, in fact, impossible for me to do either or, what means the same thing, necessary that I should do neither. Certain conditions prohibit my doing such things, though they impose to logical barrier. And finally, if someone—a physician, for example—should ask me whether I can move my finger, and I should reply truly that I can, I would not merely be telling that it is logically possible for me to move it, for this he already knows. I would be telling him that I am able to move it, that it is within my power to do so, that there are conditions, such as paralysis or what not, that prevent my moving it.

“It follows that not all necessity is logical necessity, nor all impossibility logical impossibility, and that to say that something is possible is sometimes to say much more than that it is logically possible. The kind of necessity involved in the thesis of determinism is quite obviously the nonlogical kind as is also the kind of possibilities involved in its denial. If we needed a name for these nonlogical modalities, we could call them causal necessity, impossibility, and possibility, but concepts are clear enough without making a great deal of the name.”[1]

For Taylor, determinism is not logically necessitated but causally necessitated. This is an action of man that he can not do otherwise because of the presence of conditions. Although, there are things that are logically possible (in cebuano: butang nga naa ra sa huna-huna) but in fact logically impossible. This is very clear in his examples. Freedom is logically necessitated; and the actions in Freedom are logically possible. This point will be further elaborated in the succeeding paragraphs.

In line with the thought of Taylor about logical necessity, logical necessity is essential in understanding the true concept freedom. Freedom is not born out of the presence of conditions nor it is permissiveness—that one can just do whatever he likes to do but to do what is right —what is reasonable to do as rational—thinking being such that his thoughts would not haunt him of the thing he does contrary to what is the right thing to do or what is logical to do at a given moment—especially in situations when he would have to choose between evil and good.

True freedom, born out of logical necessity, can be articulated through the experience of Victor Frankl in the concentration camp (1942) when in front of that seemingly evil outside him he found inner meaning (logical meaning so to say) to preserve his life—that freedom within--helped him to respond rightly and logically to the situation outside himself (the situation of the concentration) which encouraged suicide and passivity and probably boredom. He said:

“If a prisoner felt that he could no longer endure the realities of camp life, he found a way out in his mental life - an invaluable opportunity to dwell in the spiritual domain, the one that the SS were unable to destroy. Spiritual life strengthened the prisoner, helped him adapt, and thereby improved his chances of survival.”[2]

“Freedom can also signify inner autonomy, or mastery over one's inner condition. This has several possible significances:

the ability to act in accordance with the dictates of reason;
the ability to act in accordance with one's own true self or values;
the ability to act in accordance with universal values
(such as the True and the Good); and the ability to act independently of both the dictates of reason and the urges of desires, i.e. arbitrarily (autonomously).”[3]

This kind of freedom is a mastery of our independent logical strength. And, Richard Lovelace's poem echoes this experience:

Stone walls do not a prison make
Nor iron bars a cage
Minds innocent and quiet take
That for an hermitage[4]

[1]http://books.google.com.ph/books?id=l649AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA181&lpg=PA181&dq=causal+and+logical+necessity&source=web&ots=dYWm6eLX9l&sig=XftZrPf4iq-onUkAa54Y3j9kD1o&hl=en#PPA181,M1

[2] Man's Search for Meaning, p. 123

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_(philosophy)

[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_(philosophy)

Daniel Dennett's "The self as a Narrative Center Gravity?" versus "person as an independent existence of rational substance"

Daniel Dennett’s concept of the self as a narrative center of gravity “has a deflationary theory of the self. Selves are not physically detectable. Instead, they are a kind of convenient fiction, like a center of gravity, which are convenient as a way of solving physics problems, although they need not correspond to anything tangible — the center of gravity of a hoop is a point in thin air. People constantly tell themselves stories to make sense of their world, and they feature in the stories as a character, and that convenient but fictional character is the self.”[1] Hence, when a person for example tries to make stories he tends to feature him “self” so that others would listen so there is that movement within (self) the person to attract others towards him “self.”

Dennett’s concept of the self is different from the popular understanding of the person which believes that in each person there is that rational substance—the capability to think and so each person is independent in as far as rational thinking is concerned—a person does not have to attract others towards him “self” in order to think although he can share the product of his thinking to others. Perhaps Boethius[2] can enlighten more about the popular understanding of a person:

“Person is an individual substance of rational nature. As individual it is material, since matter supplies the principle of individuation. The soul is not person, only the composite is. Man alone is among the material beings person, he alone having a rational nature. He is the highest of the material beings, endowed with particular dignity and rights.”[3]

Together with Boethius, the English Philosopher John Locke shares the same view about the person when he said that the person is "a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it"[4]

And this same concept of the person is also shared “In the fields of philosophy, theology, and bioethics, the definition of 'person' may exclude human beings who are incapable of certain kinds of thought (such as embryos, fetuses with incomplete brain development, or adult humans lacking higher brain functions).”[5]

Daniell Denette's view about the person is his own opinion. The Christian-biblical comprehesive view of the person is still worth upholding since it views the person with mind, body, soul and spirit.
[1]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self_(philosophy)#Dennett:_The_self_as_a_narrative_center_of_gravity

[2] Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius[1] (480–524 or 525) was a Christian philosopher of the 6th century. He was born in Rome to an ancient and important family which included emperors Petronius Maximus and Olybrius and many consuls. His father, Flavius Manlius Boethius, was consul in 487 after Odoacer deposed the last Western Roman Emperor. Boethius himself was consul in 510 in the kingdom of the Ostrogoths. In 522 he saw his two sons become consuls. Boethius was executed by King Theodoric the Great, who suspected him of conspiring with the Byzantine Empire.

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person
[4] Essay on Humane Understanding, Book 2, Chapter 27, Section 9
[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person